The site becomes a second writer to scouts/site73, as the scoped scoutsite
principal (rw on that one collection, denied everywhere else by the rights
file). Two rules enforced in calendar_write.py, not left to callers: the
site owns only UIDs ending @site73.greenlanescouts73.org and refuses any
other before a network call, the same shape as band-cal-sync and @band.us;
and with no RADICALE_* configuration every write is a 503, never a silent
no-op.
The VEVENT layout matches seed.py exactly so the feed reverses it into the
row shape the public pages already render: all-day DTEND exclusive, TZID +
VTIMEZONE on timed events, 90-minute default for a timed one-day event,
noon on the end date for a timed multi-day one, CATEGORIES for the unit,
X-SCOUT73-BADGE, 75-octet folding. Reads come from the scout-calendar feed
(now carrying uid and recurring); rows the site created and that are not
part of a series are marked mine. Writes are logged to auth_events and
bust the page cache so a leader sees their event within the feed's minute.
DELETE really deletes - the calendar's history is Radicale's git log.
Endpoints under calendar:write. tests/smoke_admin.py 78 -> 102. Proven
against the real store on a 2036 probe (outside the feed window): create,
read back byte-for-byte, replace, delete, second delete 404, foreign UID
403 with no store call, unconfigured 503.
NPM sets the header with $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for, which appends the
connecting address to whatever the client sent. The first hop is therefore
client-controlled and the last is the one NPM vouches for. Reading the
first hop would have let an outsider claim a LAN address with one header,
and admin_api.client_is_lan decides on it. Found while verifying the nginx
block removal; fixed before the block came out was relied on. Also
tightens login throttling, which used the same helper.
api_keys_from is a typed setting, lan (default, the historical rule) or
anywhere, checked in admin_api._auth against the first X-Forwarded-For hop
that NPM sets. It governs API keys only: a session is never restricted, the
console is a session from anywhere; and the break-glass token is ALWAYS
LAN-only, which is not a choice and so is not a setting. LAN ranges are
facts about the network and live in code; the docker range is included
because NPM, the routines and sibling containers reach the app from
arrstack_arr_net. An unparseable address is not LAN - the rule fails closed.
With this in place the location /api/admin/ block on NPM host 51 can come
out; the app enforces what it enforced, and the toggle never touches NPM.
tests/smoke_admin.py 58 -> 76. Proven on a throwaway site: key LAN 200,
key WAN 403 naming the setting, session WAN 200, token LAN 200, token WAN
403; set anywhere, key WAN 200 and token WAN still 403; bogus value 422.
A key is the person who minted it, narrowed to the scopes they chose. Only
the sha256 is stored; the full key is returned once. Scopes must be a subset
of the owner's capabilities at mint time and are enforced again at use time
inside identity.can(), the one place that decides, so a key never outlives
its owner's demotion and disabling a person disables their keys with no
separate flag. A key cannot carry apikeys:own or the owner powers, so it
cannot mint keys. Revoked rows stay; a foreign key id is 404, never 403.
Bearer keys are honoured ONLY on /api/admin. The rest of the site reads
sessions alone, so a scoped key never widens into a browser identity.
X-Admin-Token remains break glass and, having no person, cannot own a key.
/api/docs is generated from the router on every request: path, methods and
docstring from the route objects, and the capability read out of each
handler's own _auth() call so it cannot drift from the check. Gated on a new
api:docs capability (leader and above). GET /api/admin/whoami answers who the
API thinks you are and what you can do.
Tests: smoke_identity 66 -> 92, smoke_admin 53 -> 58 (registry has a
capability for every route, docs page renders every route). Driven end to
end on a throwaway site with a DB copy: mint, whoami via key, scoped 200s
and a 403 that names the narrowing, key-mints-key 403, garbage key 401,
admin token on /keys 403, key on /account is not a session, revoke then
401, second revoke 409.
MEETING_DAY, MEETING_DAYS, MEETING_DAY_ABBR, PACK_TIME, TROOP_TIME,
PACK_CLOCK and TROOP_CLOCK were the last thing a leader could not change
without a commit. identity.meeting_words() derives all seven from the units
rows; app.py refreshes the module globals from it on a 30-second TTL in a
middleware, and the page templates - f-strings that read those globals when a
route runs - are untouched. A row that cannot supply a word keeps the
default, so a half-filled unit degrades to today's copy rather than a blank.
The day words come from the pack row: the site's copy assumes both units
meet the same night, and if that changes the copy needs rewriting, not a
bigger constant. Proven on a throwaway container with a DB copy: patching
pack73 to Thursday 18:15 changed the homepage, cubs, troop and meta
description; patching back restored them. tests/smoke_identity.py 59 -> 66.
The console's 401 redirect carries next=/leaders/ and /login dropped it, so a
leader arriving cold landed on /account. next now rides the form as a hidden
field and is applied after a successful POST and when an already-signed-in
person hits /login. identity.safe_next() admits only a relative path with a
single leading slash - no scheme, no //, no backslash, no control characters -
so the login page cannot become an open redirect. Ten checks added to
tests/smoke_identity.py; the suite is 59 + 24 + 53, all green.
Nearby rows bump verified_at on every save and deactivate rather than delete.
Unit edits are meeting fields only, gated by unit:write_own scoped to the unit
in the URL. Settings are a typed key registry falling back to code defaults;
find-a-unit now reads its source name and URL from it. link_url and contact
reject attribute-breakout characters and the nearby renderer escapes quotes.
Covered by tests/smoke_admin.py, 53 checks in-process.
documents.visible() now takes the viewer's unit set. A members document is
served and listed only to a signed-in member of the matching unit; 'both'
reaches any member; owner and admin reach everything including unit types
added later. Everyone else gets 404, never 403.
The gate moved INSIDE find(), so there is one path from a slug to a file and
no route can forget to check. listed() and visible() stay separate functions.
admin_api takes a session first and falls back to X-Admin-Token as break
glass. Still fails closed: no session and no ADMIN_TOKEN is 503. Capability,
not role, decides per route. announcements.created_by now comes from the
session and ignores any value in the request body.
tests/smoke_documents.py, 24 checks, including the invariant that the index
can never list something serving would refuse.
Portainer stack variables are substitution values for the compose file,
not container environment. A var added to the stack and not listed here
is silently absent at runtime.
Adds identity.py (schema, capability map, scrypt passwords, invites,
sessions, login throttle, boot seed) and auth.py (login, invite
acceptance, account page). app.py gains two imports and one wiring
block at EOF; no existing behaviour changes.
Units are a table seeded from the site constants. Roles split: leader
and member per unit in memberships, owner and admin site-wide in
people.global_role, so a unit added later cannot under-grant an admin.
tests/smoke_identity.py covers the rules that are invisible when wrong:
single-use invites, reissue revoking the prior link, expiry, idle and
absolute session bounds, throttling, and the capability split. 49 checks.
The app is the only process on this box accepting unauthenticated input from
the internet and it was running as root in a writable container. Now uid 10001,
read_only with a tmpfs /tmp, cap_drop ALL and no-new-privileges. Host-side
/srv/scout-website/data and the service account key are chowned to 10001.
Verified on a throwaway container: every route, the admin API, spam rejection,
and a real submission writing to both the jsonl and SQLite.
NPM proxies to scout-website:8000 over arrstack_arr_net, so the 0.0.0.0 publish
only provided a LAN path that bypassed the proxy, its exploit blocking and its
real-client-IP logging.
Three bot submissions landed 2026-08-30 with both selects carrying the
placeholder label "Select one..." - required= is browser-only and a direct
POST skips it. Adds a hidden honeypot (answers 303 so the bot sees success)
and server-side checks on name, email, children, interested_in and source.
Rejections are logged with the client IP and never touch any store.
thethreemagi