POST /fbposts/{id}/reschedule {message, scheduled_for}. The site derives
the per-post signature from the stored cancel link and asks the publisher
to delete the post on Facebook and redraft the queue file; the row goes
to drafted with no Facebook id and no cancel link until the publisher's
next cycle reports the new one. Times must be at least 15 minutes out,
with an offset. An explicit null now clears fb_post_id on upsert; an
absent one still keeps it. tests/smoke_admin.py 160 -> 162.
Facebook does not call back and the reconciliation was never built, so a
row that stayed scheduled forever was a lie of omission. Decided by Mike:
once the time passes with nothing else reported, the post is published.
status keeps what the publisher last said; state is what a reader acts
on, and the open-only list and cancel use state. Cancel on a post whose
time has passed says so.
Open item 12, designed 2026-08-26, built today. scout-publisher reports
every post it drafts, schedules, holds or cancels by POSTing here; it
never opens the database. id is <unit>/<queue-stem>, stable across body
edits, so a redrafted post is one row and cancel is an indexed lookup on
fb_post_id. The image is copied, content-addressed at
/data/post-images/<sha256>.<ext>, and the sha256 is recomputed on arrival
- a mismatch is refused, so a row never claims a version nobody sent.
image_ref keeps the NAS path as provenance. The image route runs the same
capability check as the list on every request. Cancel goes through the
publisher's own signed per-post link stored on the row; the site never
holds the publisher's secret. fbposts:read for leaders, fbposts:ingest
for admins and scopable so the publisher's key carries exactly that.
tests/smoke_admin.py 147 -> 157.
household_people joins a roster family to the accounts of its parents; a
household can have two, a person can rarely be on two. PUT
/roster/households/{id}/people sets it (admin and above). GET /family
(account:self) returns the signed-in person's own households with scouts
and this year's checklist, and nothing else - the parent view of the
roster, read only. Inactive households drop off it.
tests/smoke_admin.py 141 -> 147.
Decided by Mike 2026-09-04. my.scouting stays the record of registration;
this holds what a den leader needs on a Tuesday: the families, which scout
is in which den, and a per-program-year checklist of things collected -
dues paid, health form handed in - recording THAT a thing was collected,
by whom and when, never the thing. Health forms are never stored here;
that is a policy, not a gap. A scout is a first name, last name, unit,
den and an optional BSA member ID (the recharter join key), and nothing
else: no date of birth, no address, nothing medical, and a test asserts
no such column exists.
A join lead can be imported as a household: contact copied, the children
field carried as a note to sort by hand, the lead linked and untouched.
Importing twice is 409.
roster:write for leader and above, never on a script key. Every write
lands in the action log. scout-website-backup.timer already copies the
database nightly, which was the doc's first condition for naming scouts.
tests/smoke_admin.py 122 -> 141.
Who picked a lead up and when, so nothing sits waiting unnoticed. No
outcomes, no end states, nothing on join_leads changes: the lead stays the
record of what the family said and the claim is only who has it. One row
per claim in lead_claims; the current claim is the latest unreleased.
Taking over is release then claim, never a silent overwrite: 409 names
the holder. The holder or an owner may release. Every claim and release
lands in the action log; the summary carries an unclaimed count.
tests/smoke_admin.py 112 -> 122.
calendar_write.owns() now accepts both site namespaces: the 32 events the
2026-08-29 seed stamped site73-<sha1>@greenlanescouts73.org and the site's
own @site73.greenlanescouts73.org. The rule exists to keep the site off
@band.us and off anything a person adds in a calendar client, not off its
own data. Seeded objects are written back at the seeder's object name so
an edit replaces in place; proven on a throwaway against the real store
(edit, still 32 objects, restored byte-for-byte).
auth_events becomes the one action log. Every P2 write - nearby create,
update, deactivate; unit meeting edit; setting change; announcement post
and take-down - now records who, when, and a one-line before -> after for
the fields that changed, alongside the login, key and calendar entries
already there. GET /api/admin/history (history:read, admin and above, not
scopable on a key) reads it newest first with a kind prefix filter and
before= paging; rowid breaks second-resolution ties.
tests/smoke_admin.py 102 -> 112.
The site becomes a second writer to scouts/site73, as the scoped scoutsite
principal (rw on that one collection, denied everywhere else by the rights
file). Two rules enforced in calendar_write.py, not left to callers: the
site owns only UIDs ending @site73.greenlanescouts73.org and refuses any
other before a network call, the same shape as band-cal-sync and @band.us;
and with no RADICALE_* configuration every write is a 503, never a silent
no-op.
The VEVENT layout matches seed.py exactly so the feed reverses it into the
row shape the public pages already render: all-day DTEND exclusive, TZID +
VTIMEZONE on timed events, 90-minute default for a timed one-day event,
noon on the end date for a timed multi-day one, CATEGORIES for the unit,
X-SCOUT73-BADGE, 75-octet folding. Reads come from the scout-calendar feed
(now carrying uid and recurring); rows the site created and that are not
part of a series are marked mine. Writes are logged to auth_events and
bust the page cache so a leader sees their event within the feed's minute.
DELETE really deletes - the calendar's history is Radicale's git log.
Endpoints under calendar:write. tests/smoke_admin.py 78 -> 102. Proven
against the real store on a 2036 probe (outside the feed window): create,
read back byte-for-byte, replace, delete, second delete 404, foreign UID
403 with no store call, unconfigured 503.
NPM sets the header with $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for, which appends the
connecting address to whatever the client sent. The first hop is therefore
client-controlled and the last is the one NPM vouches for. Reading the
first hop would have let an outsider claim a LAN address with one header,
and admin_api.client_is_lan decides on it. Found while verifying the nginx
block removal; fixed before the block came out was relied on. Also
tightens login throttling, which used the same helper.
api_keys_from is a typed setting, lan (default, the historical rule) or
anywhere, checked in admin_api._auth against the first X-Forwarded-For hop
that NPM sets. It governs API keys only: a session is never restricted, the
console is a session from anywhere; and the break-glass token is ALWAYS
LAN-only, which is not a choice and so is not a setting. LAN ranges are
facts about the network and live in code; the docker range is included
because NPM, the routines and sibling containers reach the app from
arrstack_arr_net. An unparseable address is not LAN - the rule fails closed.
With this in place the location /api/admin/ block on NPM host 51 can come
out; the app enforces what it enforced, and the toggle never touches NPM.
tests/smoke_admin.py 58 -> 76. Proven on a throwaway site: key LAN 200,
key WAN 403 naming the setting, session WAN 200, token LAN 200, token WAN
403; set anywhere, key WAN 200 and token WAN still 403; bogus value 422.
A key is the person who minted it, narrowed to the scopes they chose. Only
the sha256 is stored; the full key is returned once. Scopes must be a subset
of the owner's capabilities at mint time and are enforced again at use time
inside identity.can(), the one place that decides, so a key never outlives
its owner's demotion and disabling a person disables their keys with no
separate flag. A key cannot carry apikeys:own or the owner powers, so it
cannot mint keys. Revoked rows stay; a foreign key id is 404, never 403.
Bearer keys are honoured ONLY on /api/admin. The rest of the site reads
sessions alone, so a scoped key never widens into a browser identity.
X-Admin-Token remains break glass and, having no person, cannot own a key.
/api/docs is generated from the router on every request: path, methods and
docstring from the route objects, and the capability read out of each
handler's own _auth() call so it cannot drift from the check. Gated on a new
api:docs capability (leader and above). GET /api/admin/whoami answers who the
API thinks you are and what you can do.
Tests: smoke_identity 66 -> 92, smoke_admin 53 -> 58 (registry has a
capability for every route, docs page renders every route). Driven end to
end on a throwaway site with a DB copy: mint, whoami via key, scoped 200s
and a 403 that names the narrowing, key-mints-key 403, garbage key 401,
admin token on /keys 403, key on /account is not a session, revoke then
401, second revoke 409.
Nearby rows bump verified_at on every save and deactivate rather than delete.
Unit edits are meeting fields only, gated by unit:write_own scoped to the unit
in the URL. Settings are a typed key registry falling back to code defaults;
find-a-unit now reads its source name and URL from it. link_url and contact
reject attribute-breakout characters and the nearby renderer escapes quotes.
Covered by tests/smoke_admin.py, 53 checks in-process.
thethreemagi